This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. Readers will learn (...) about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic. (shrink)

This book about philosophy of medicine bestows a bottom-up and not a top-down approach. It starts from clinical medicine and epidemiology, analyzing their interrelations with philosophical instruments. The book criticizes the constant search for generalities and the essentialism that too often characterizes this discipline, which results in philosophers of medicine dialoguing with each other without direct contact with medical science. In the light of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy, this book proposes an approach to the philosophy of medicine based on the quorum (...) of language, what Wittgenstein calls family resemblances. In this way the author establishes a philosophy of medicine that is closely related to the medical clinic and to public health and as such avoids armchair philosophy. “Don’t think, but look", wrote Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Le commun imagine mal que les philosophes, gens. austères et graves, puissent s abandonner au rire, ou même qu'ils daignent, s'interroger sur la signification et la désirabilité de ce comportement frivole.t pourtant si, comme l'observa le premier Aristote, " rire est le propre de l'homme ", il faut bien que les philosophes sachent rire, comme tout à chacun, et même qu'ils s'inquiètent des raisons d'être du rire, de sa finalité, d'autant plus que leur propre démarche et leurs ambitions ont depuis (...) toujours prêté à rire aux profanes. Rire est-il pour l'homme un privilège ou une tare? Si les dieux d'Homère s'esclaffent dans l'Olympe, Jésus lui n'aurait jamais ri. Repoussant les réserves de Descartes, Spinoza a pris résolument le parti du rire. Et si Nietzsche nous demande de rire à la vie, c'est par contre au nom de la vie que Bergson intente un procès au rire. Tout se passe comme si ces appréciations contradictoires du rire, loin d'être dune importance secondaire, traçaient une nette ligne de partage entre les philosophes, révélant peut-être des divergences décisives entre leurs options fondamentales. (shrink)

t. 1. Essai de définition d'un champ de recherche.

La bioéthique est à la mode. Il faut " être pour "! La prochaine étude par le législateur français des lois " bioéthiques " en témoigne. Avortement, fabrication d'enfants " prêts-à-porter ", recherche biomédicale, clonage, génétique, rien n'échappe à la bioéthique. Et si, cheval de Troie pénétrant le droit, la morale, les déontologies, elle ne constituait qu'une habile machine de subversion des sciences médicales, d'appropriation globale de l'être humain. Des médecins, des philosophes, parlementaires, juristes engagés dans l'examen des doctrines et (...) mécanismes bioéthiques se sont posés la question. Leur réponse n'est vraiment pas celle du " consensus ". Elle impose au public savant et aux gens prétendus ordinaires et à leurs représentants dans la Cité, une réflexion, un retour vers une nouvelle liberté de penser. (shrink)

Ainsi donc parlaient les anciens philosophes. Leurs paroles ne sont point perdues dans les vestiges de temples morts, d'Athènes, d'Ephèse ou de Rome: recueillies, trancrites, commentées, elles ont engendré d'autres paroles qui elles-même en ont nourri d'autres. Ainsi d'âge en âge aura-t-on puisé dans ce trésor de mots, venu de si loin, où les siècles à venir trouveront de quoi se faire l'idée d'un bonheur et d'une sagesse. De ce cercle de penseurs disparus, Jean-Paul Dumont connaissait tout, et mieux que (...) personne: les premiers rôles et les comparses, les figures et les figurants. Il avait tout surpris, tout retenu de leurs conversations, de leurs empoignades, de leurs rognes et de leurs rires. Pour honorer sa mémoire et poursuivre ce dialogue ininterrompu avec les penseurs de l'aurore de la philosophie, vingt-trois de ses élèves, collègues et amis ont, à leur tour, voulu faire parler les Anciens, en particulier Platon et les philosophes du monde hellénistique. De Zénon d'Elée à Philodème, de Diogène de Babylone à Sextus Empiricus, de Platon à Saint Augustin, tous témoignent du bonheur du discours et de la fécondité d'une temps qui ne songeait pas à séparer la vie et la pensée. Outre une étude inédite sur "Le modèle parménidien de l'assimilation: pensée, sensation et vie", le volume comprend aussi la réédition de deux articles devenus introuvables de Jean-Paul Dumont "Diogène de Babylone et la preuve onthologique" et "L'âme et la main, signification du geste de Zénon", ainsi que la bibliographie complète de ses oeuvres. (shrink)

Le sens commun vise-t-il la connaissance? Le sens commun et la quantité.--Hegel, Hamilton, Hamelin et le concept de cause.--Philosophie de la nature et philosophie de l'intellect.--De l'analyse des produits de la pensée.--Les mathématiques et le divers.--Le savoir et l'univers de la perception immédiate.--La notion de l'identique.--Jean Rey et la loi de la conservation de la matière.--Théodore Turquet de Mayerne et la découverte de l'hydrogène.--La coupellation chez les anciens Juifs.--Y a-t-il un rhythme dans le progrès intellectuel?

According to recent commentators like Paul Guyer, Kant agrees with Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that physico-theology can never provide knowledge of God and that the concept of God, nevertheless, provides a useful heuristic principle for scientific enquiry. This paper argues that Kant, far from agreeing with Hume, criticizes Hume's Dialogues for failing to prove that physico-theology can never yield knowledge of God and that Kant correctly views Hume's Dialogues as a threat to, rather than an anticipation of, his own (...) view that the concept of God provides a useful heuristic principle for science. The paper concludes that Kant's critique of physico-theology reflects Kant's deep dissatisfaction with Hume's manner of argumentation and suggests that Kant's attempt to provide a more successful critique of physico-theology merits continued philosophical attention. (shrink)

En novembre 2002, a eu lieu, à l'Université de Liège, une rencontre entre chercheurs d'horizons divers autour du Cap des Tempêtes de Lucien François, publié dans cette même collection. Le droit sans la justice? Aux yeux d'Augustin et de la tradition du droit naturel en général, il est impossible d'abstraire l'un de l'autre sans donner raison au fameux pirate répliquant à Alexandre le Grand : " Parce que j'opère avec un petit navire, on m'appelle brigand ; toi, parce que (...) tu opères avec une grande flotte, Empereur! ". Que répondent à cette objection les théoriciens positivistes qui séparent quant à eux droit et justice? Comment rendent-ils compte, sans la justice, de la différence entre un Etat et une troupe de brigands, une arrestation et un rapt, une extorsion et un impôt? L'un des plus réputés d'entre eux, N. Bobbio, parlait de cette question comme du " cap des Tempêtes " que ne peut éviter d'affronter tout positivisme juridique. Le cap des Tempêtes. Essai de microscopie du droit est précisément le titre que L. François, Professeur émérite à l'Université de Liège, a donné à son dernier ouvrage. Il s'agit sans doute d'une des tentatives les plus radicales pour approcher le phénomène juridique en dehors de tout présupposé moral, selon une perspective " microscopique " originale qui met le même soin à analyser une file d'attente, un racket, ou l'organisation complexe de ce que nous appelons " l'État ". Quelles sont les conséquences philosophiques de cette approche microscopique du droit? Sur quels présupposés repose-t-elle? Y a-t-il une anthropologie, voire une ontologie, qui la sous-tendent? Et in fine, est-il réellement possible de concevoir le droit en faisant abstraction de tout principe, du moins de tout horizon, de justice? (shrink)

A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason. Friedrich Schiller advanced a version of this criticism to which Kant publicly responded. Recent commentators have emphasized the role that Kant’s reply assigns to the pleasure that accompanies successful moral action. In contrast, I argue that Kant’s reply relies primarily on the sublime feeling that arises when we merely contemplate the moral law. In fact, the pleasures emphasized by other recent commentators depend on this sublime (...) feeling. These facts illuminate Kant’s views regarding the relationship between morality, freedom, and the development of moral feelings. (shrink)

In this landmark work of economic sociology, Lucien Karpik introduces the theory and practical tools needed to analyze markets for singularities. Singularities are goods and services that cannot be studied by standard methods because they are multidimensional, incommensurable, and of uncertain quality. Examples include movies, novels, music, artwork, fine wine, lawyers, and doctors. Valuing the Unique provides a theoretical framework to explain this important class of products and markets that for so long have eluded neoclassical economics. With this innovative (...) theory--called the economics of singularities--Karpik shows that, because of the uncertainty and the highly subjective valuation of singularities, these markets are necessarily equipped with what he calls "judgment devices"--such as labels, brands, guides, critics, and rankings--which provide consumers with the credible knowledge needed to make reasonable choices. He explains why these markets are characterized by the primacy of competition by qualities over competition by prices, and he identifies the conditions under which singularities are constructed or are in danger of losing their uniqueness. After demonstrating how combinations of the numerous and multiform judgment devices can be used to identify different market models, Karpik applies his analytical tools to the functioning of a large number of actual markets, including fine wines, movies, luxury goods, pop music, and legal services. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Kant's treatment of infinity seems to be plagued by two contradictions. First, the Transcendental Aesthetic claims that space is an infinite given magnitude, whereas the First Antinomy argues that the spatial world cannot be infinite. Second, the Transcendental Aesthetic claims that the representation of infinite space belongs to sensibility, but the third Critique seems to argue, instead, that infinity is an Idea of reason. This paper resolves these apparent contradictions by noting that Kant groups his various conceptions of space into (...) three kinds: (1) merely subjectively given space, (2) objectively given space, and (3) objective space as a mere Idea. Attending to these three conceptions of space illustrates that the Transcendental Aesthetic, First Antinomy, and third Critique refer to different conceptions of infinite space and thus do not contradict one another, illuminating the importance of Kant's various conceptions of space for his critical project. (shrink)

Kant claims that an intuitive understanding—such as God would possess—could cognize things in themselves. This claim has prompted many interpreters of Kant's theoretical philosophy to propose that things in themselves correspond to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. In contrast, I argue that Kant's theoretical philosophy does not endorse the common proposal that all things in themselves correspond to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. Instead, Kant's theoretical philosophy maintains that things in themselves might or might not correspond (...) to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. I then consider whether Kant's moral philosophy and theory of reflecting judgment might provide alternative grounds for claiming that we should regard things in themselves as corresponding to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. I argue that Kant's moral philosophy does not provide such grounds, but his theory of reflecting judgment does. Thus, interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism should attend to the differences between Kant's theoretical philosophy, moral philosophy, and theory of reflecting judgment in assessing the relationship between intuitive understanding and things in themselves. (shrink)

This article offers a novel account of a key concept in Hannah Arendt’s political thought: amor mundi. In political theory’s ethical turn, theorists have increasingly turned to amor mundi as a source of ethical guidance and inspiration for politics. However, in doing so, they have elided Arendt’s distinct understanding of care. This article recovers Arendt’s understanding of amor mundi as care for the world by reconstructing the central concerns of her dissertation, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, and tracing them to the (...) “Crisis” essays of Between Past and Future. It shows that amor mundi emerges in the dissertation as part of a question: if love is our fundamental orientation toward the world, how can we love the world without instrumentalizing it? The two “Crisis” essays provide the following answer: if love is to avoid—and perhaps militate against—the instrumentalization of the world, it must take the form of care. Following this analysis, this article contends that the contribution of amor mundi to the ethical turn is best understood, not as the ethos needed to guide action in the political realm, but as a key pre- or nonpolitical ethos needed to conserve the world where politics takes place—and thus the very possibility of politics. (shrink)

Recent research on thick terms like “rude” and “friendly” has revealed a polarity effect, according to which the evaluative content of positive thick terms like “friendly” and “courageous” can be more easily canceled than the evaluative content of negative terms like “rude” and “selfish”. In this paper, we study the polarity effect in greater detail. We first demonstrate that the polarity effect is insensitive to manipulations of embeddings (Study 1). Second, we show that the effect occurs not only for thick (...) terms but also for thin terms such as “good” or “bad” (Study 2). We conclude that the polarity effect indicates a pervasive asymmetry between positive and negative evaluative terms. (shrink)

The concept of ‘world visions’, first elaborated in the early work of Georg Lukàcs, is used here as a tool whereby the similarities between Pascal’s Pensées and Kant’s critical philosophy are contrasted with the rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Hume. For Lucien Goldmann, a leading exponent of the most fruitful method of applying Marxist ideas to literary and philosophical problems, the ‘tragic vision’ marked an important phase in the development of European thought from rationalism and empiricism to (...) the dialectical philosophy of Hegel, Marx and Lukàcs. The book is not a collection of isolated essays on Kant, Pascal, Racine, the status of the legal nobility in seventeenth-century France and the exact nature of the religious movement known as Jansenism, but an attempt to formulate, by an examination of these different topics, a general approach to the problems of philosophy, of literary criticism, and of the relationship between thought and action in human society. (shrink)

In his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste,’ Hume argues that artworks with morally flawed outlooks are, to some extent, aesthetically flawed. While Hume's remarks regarding the relationship between art and morality have influenced contemporary aestheticians, Hume's own position has struck many people as incoherent. For Hume appears to entangle himself in two separate contradictions. First, Hume seems to claim both that true judges should not enter into vicious sentiments and that true judges should adopt the standpoint of an artwork's (...) intended audience. But The Iliad, say, was obviously intended for an audience that shared Homer's flawed moral outlook. Second, Hume appears to claim that our moral sentiments are both highly resistant to change and extremely fragile. This essay defends Hume against these two objections by drawing increased attention to the role that Hume's aesthetics assigns to the faculty of good sense or sound reason. (shrink)

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation (RI) focus (...) on how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI. (shrink)

In §76 of the 3rd Critique, Kant claims that an intuitive understanding would represent no distinction between possible and actual things. Prior interpretations of §76 take Kant to claim that an intuitive understanding would produce things merely in virtue of thinking about them and, thus, could not think of merely possible things. In contrast, I argue that §76’s modal claims hinge on Kant’s suggestion that God represents things in their thoroughgoing determination, including in their connection to God’s actual will. I (...) conclude by using my interpretation to argue that §76’s modal claims do not entail Spinozism. (shrink)

Hegel famously criticizes Kant’s resolution of the antinomies. According to Sedgwick, Hegel primarily chastises Kant’s resolution for presupposing that concepts are ‘one-sided’, rather than identical to their opposites. If Kant had accepted the dialectical nature of concepts, then (according to Sedgwick) Kant would not have needed to resolve the antinomies. However, as Ameriks has noted, any such interpretation faces a serious challenge. Namely, Kant’s first antinomy concerns the universe’s physical dimensions. Even if we grant that the concept of the finite (...) is necessarily related to that of the infinite, the physical universe cannot both have and lack a temporal beginning. I argue that Hegel neither adopts Sedgwick’s view that Kant’s antinomies require no resolution nor absurdly accepts that the physical universe both has and lacks a temporal beginning. Instead, Hegel proposes a sophisticated resolution of Kant’s first antinomy (including its physical aspect) that depends on Hegel’s theory of the Absolute. (shrink)

How evaluative are legal texts? Do legal scholars and jurists speak a more descriptive or perhaps a more evaluative language? In this paper, we present the results of a corpus study in which we examined the use of evaluative language in both the legal domain as well as public discourse. For this purpose, we created two corpora. Our legal professional corpus is based on court opinions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. We compared this professional corpus to a public corpus, (...) which is based on blog discussions on the internet forum Reddit. While many linguistic phenomena can give insights into evaluativity, we investigated the use of a wide selection of evaluative adjectives (more specifically, thick adjectives) to gain a more comprehensive picture of the degree of evaluativity in the legal domain. Our analysis shows that legal professionals use thick terms less evaluatively than laypeople, which suggests that legal texts are less evaluative than ordinary discussions. This result, more generally, supports the philosophical idea that thick concepts may vary in their evaluative intensity. (shrink)

Bell inequalities play a central role in the study of quantum nonlocality and entanglement, with many applications in quantum information. Despite the huge literature on Bell inequalities, it is not easy to find a clear conceptual answer to what a Bell inequality is, or a clear guiding principle as to how they may be derived. In this paper, we introduce a notion of logical Bell inequality which can be used to systematically derive testable inequalities for a very wide variety of (...) situations. There is a single clear conceptual principle, based on purely logical consistency conditions, which underlies our notion of logical Bell inequalities. We show that in a precise sense, all Bell inequalities can be taken to be of this form. Our approach is very general. It applies directly to any family of sets of commuting observables. Thus it covers not only the n-partite scenarios to which Bell inequalities are standardly applied, but also Kochen-Specker configurations, and many other examples. There is much current work on experimental tests for contextuality. Our approach directly yields, in a systematic fashion, testable inequalities for a very general notion of contextuality. There has been much work on obtaining proofs of Bell's theorem “without inequalities” or “without probabilities.” These proofs are seen as being in a sense more definitive and logically robust than the inequality-based proofs. On the hand, they lack the fault-tolerant aspect of inequalities. Our approach reconciles these aspects, and in fact shows how the logical robustness can be converted into systematic, general derivations of inequalities with provable violations. Moreover, the kind of strong non-locality or contextuality exhibited by the GHZ argument or by Kochen-Specker configurations can be shown to lead to maximal violations of the corresponding logical Bell inequalities. Thus the qualitative and the quantitative aspects are combined harmoniously. (shrink)

The reasonable person standard is key to both Criminal Law and Torts. What does and does not count as reasonable behavior and decision-making is frequently deter- mined by lay jurors. Hence, laypeople’s understanding of the term must be considered, especially whether they use it predominately in an evaluative fashion. In this corpus study based on supervised machine learning models, we investigate whether laypeople use the expression ‘reasonable’ mainly as a descriptive, an evaluative, or merely a value-associated term. We find that (...) ‘reasonable’ is predicted to be an evaluative term in the majority of cases. This supports prescriptive accounts, and challenges descriptive and hybrid accounts of the term—at least given the way we operationalize the latter. Interestingly, other expressions often used interchangeably in jury instructions (e.g. ‘careful,’ ‘ordinary,’ ‘prudent,’ etc), however, are predicted to be descriptive. This indicates a discrepancy between the intended use of the term ‘reasonable’ and the understanding lay jurors might bring into the court room. (shrink)

Acts that are considered undesirable standardly violate our expectations. In contrast, acts that count as morally desirable can either meet our expectations or exceed them. The zone in which an act can be morally desirable yet not exceed our expectations is what we call the zone of moral indifference, and it has so far been neglected. In this paper, we show that people can use positive terms in a deflated manner to refer to actions in the zone of moral indifference, (...) whereas negative terms cannot be so interpreted. (shrink)